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HOME BOX OFFICEAND THE FCC'S REASONABLY
ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Uncontrolled access to the broadcast spectrum by radio entrepreneurs
in the first two decades of this century virtually reduced that field to
chaos.' Broadcasters selected transmission frequencies at will and blared
out programming freely, inevitably resulting in a situation in which
"nobody could be heard."2 In response to this confusion, Congress enacted
the Communications Act of 1934,1 which created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and gave it broad regulatory authority over the
radio communications field.' The principal purpose of the Commission was
to control access to and use of the broadcast spectrum to promote public
convenience, interest, or necessity.' Congress thus designed the Commission to facilitate federal regulation of broadcasting, to prevent interference
among those using the airwaves, and to allocate that scarce resource for
the best practicable communications service.'
A rapidly developing communications technology, however, soon compounded the regulatory problems confronting the Commission.7 Not long
after entering the field, broadcast television8 replaced radio as the dominant electronic communications medium. Like radio, broadcast television
I See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-76 (1969); Berman, CATV
Leased Access Channelsand the FCC: The IntractableJurisdictionQuestion, 51 NORE DAME
LAW. 145 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Berman].
2 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-609 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)).
' The FCC's original authority encompassed all interstate and foreign communications
by wire or radio including those by "writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds."
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 1065 (1934) (presently codified at 47
U.S.C. §§ 152(a), 153 (1970)).
See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214-15, 217 (1943).
Congress regulated radio through the FCC to prevent signal interference and to allocate
scarce spectrum space to broadcasters. Unrestricted access to and use of the broadcast spectrum by radio broadcasters had produced such distortion and overlapping of signals that
communication was often impossible. Some coordination of the use of radio signals was
imperative to avoid this signal interference. See Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New
Technology: The Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 427, 440 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Hagelin]. In making its regulatory decision, Congress also recognized
that the electromagnetic spectrum utilized by radio broadcasters is a physically limited
natural resource. Since relatively few broadcasters could make use of the spectrum if communication were to be possible, the government determined in the Communications Act that
the Commission should allocate use of the airwaves. See S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
1-3 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 19-23 (1934). Broadcasters gaining access
to the spectrum thereby would enjoy a privilege, but would be required to use that privilege
to serve the needs of the public. See Hagelin, supra at 441.
See D. LEDuc,CABLE TELE ISION AND THE FCC 55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as LEDuc].
Broadcast, or conventional, television transmits programming by radio signal through
the broadcast spectrum. The programming may be received by anyone with proper television
reception devices within the broadcast range. See W. JONES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ELcTRONIC MASS MEDIA 1-2 (1976).
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transmitted through the airwaves and therefore presented the same problems of unregulated electrical interference and spectrum scarcity that
plagued early radio history.' Because the FCC's statutory authority was
founded on the allocation of the scarce radio broadcast spectrum and specifically encompassed radio transmissions of pictures,"0 the Commission
was the obvious regulatory authority to oversee broadcast television." The
Commission's regulatory problems increased even further with the appearance of community antenna television during the 1950's. Community antenna television, commonly known as cable TV, offered, for a fee, enhanced reception of broadcast signals in areas where broadcast signals
were weak." Unlike broadcast television, this system did not interfere with
other communications services because it transmitted the signals by cable
directly to subscribers' homes. Because cable TV transmitted by wire and
made no demands on the broadcast spectrum, the FCC initially considered
that medium to be beyond its jurisdiction. 3 Broadcasters later applied the
cable TV concept to over-the-air transmissions and offered subscription
television (STV) to viewers, a service that made available to subscribers
originally produced programming not carried over conventional broadcast
TV." Subscription television broadcasted over the air, like conventional
television, but scrambled the transmissions so that only subscribers paying
See LEDuc, supra note 7, at 55-56.
10

See note 4 supra.

See Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictionaland
ConstitutionalLimitations, 53 DEN. L.J. 477 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hoffer].
12 A cable television system is
[any facility that, in whole or in part, receives directly or indirectly over the air
and amplifies or otherwise modifies the signals transmitting programs broadcast by
one or more television or radio stations and distributes such signals by wire or cable
to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service. . . . 47 C.F.R. §
76.5(a) (1976).
In a cable television system, a master antenna installed at a favorable location near the area
to be served by the cable system receives signals from television stations and transmits them
by wire to the cable serving the community. Customers' television sets are linked to the cable,
and relay amplifiers located along the cable boost the signals to provide clearer reception.
See Carter Mountain Transm'n Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359, 361 n.1 (D.C. Cir.), aff'g Carter
Mountain Transm'n Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
11The FCC initially disclaimed regulatory authority over cable television, holding that
Title II of the Communications Act, which grants the FCC regulatory authority over common
carriers, did not extend to cable TV. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251,
253-55 (1958). Furthermore, the Commission noted that because cable operations do not
constitute broadcasting, such operations could not be regulated directly under Title I of the
Act, which gave the FCC jurisdiction to regulate broadcasters. See id. at 255-56.
The Commission first asserted jurisdiction over cable television indirectly by regulating
cable use of microwave common carriers. A common carrier in the communications field
provides a means of communication to anyone wishing access. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970).
By restricting cable use of facilities clearly within FCC regulatory authority, the Commission
indirectly could regulate cable TV to promote established goals in the field of television
broadcasting. See Carter Mountain Transm'n Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 (1962). For a historical development of FCC regulatory authority over cable television, see LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise of ProgrammingDiversity, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 25, 36-89 (1973).
" See First Report, 23 F.C.C.2d 532, 542-43 (1957).
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a monthly fee for use of a decoding device could receive the transmissions
in an intelligible form.'5 By making use of the scarce broadcast spectrum,
STV came within FCC regulatory jurisdiction,'6 and the Commission, to
ensure that STV would be distinct from conventional television,' 7 imposed
rules on the new service restricting the type of programming that could be

shown."
Cable entrepreneurs also pursued the idea of subscription television
and in 1972 began to offer a similar service called pay-cablecasting or paycable TV. In addition to bringing stronger broadcast signals to customers'
homes, the cable system enabled a cable operator to cablecast" selected
programs through the system to customers willing to pay to receive such
programming."0 Services such as first-run movies could be shown for a
small fee without editing or commercial interruption, turning each subscriber's home into a virtual "home box office." 2' Because such programming
originated with the cable operator and was transmitted to his customers
solely by wire, this new service placed no demands on the limited broadcast spectrum. Nevertheless, the rise of this service alarmed broadcasters
who feared that revenues generated by cable operations might enable cable
systems to bid away, or "siphon", 22 the most profitable programming avail,5 See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 2 (1975). See generally Hoffer, supranote
11, at 479-80.
11In 1955, the FCC invited comments from the public to determine whether the public
interest would be served by authorizing television broadcast stations to transmit programming paid for on a subscription basis. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 Fed. Reg. 988,
989 (1955). After reviewing these comments, the Commission concluded that the FCC had
the power to license STV operations but required trial demonstrations of such a system before
approving the service. First Report, 23 F.C.C. 532 (1957). After the requisite demonstrations,
the Commission authorized a permanent, nationwide system of subscription television in 1968
and established rules governing the system. See Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466
(1968), aff'd sub nom., National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). Although four STV systems have been licensed since
1968, none are operating today. See Brief for Respondent FCC at 56-57 & n.58, Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3190-91 (U.S.
October 4, 1977) (Nos. 76-1724, 76-1841, 76-1842).
'1 The FCC authorized STV operations but imposed rules requiring the transmission on
subscription channels of programming which would not merely duplicate programming already available on conventional television. Subscription television thus would be a beneficial
supplement to existing television service. See Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 48388 (1968). See also text accompanying notes 85-93 infra.
Is See Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968) (presently codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.643 (1976)). See also text accompanying notes 85-93 infra.
'9 Cablecast programming is programming originated by cable operators and received
only by cable viewers. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1972).
2 See Hoffer, supra note 11, at 480-81.
21 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
2 Siphoning describes the purchase of talent of programming from conventional television programming suppliers by subscription or cable television competing with the broadcast
industry. Id. Hoffer, supra note 11, at 481. Both broadcasters and the Commission argue that
cable operators, relying on subscriber revenues, will have sufficient economic strength to
outbid commercially supported broadcast operators for the best television talent and programming. See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 72 (1975) (Statement of Commissioner
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able. 23
To protect conventional television's programming sources and to ensure
free public access to such programming, broadcasters asked the FCC to
promulgate a series of "anti-siphoning" rules restricting the type of programming that may be cablecast for either a per-channel or per-program
fee. 4 When the Commission initially considered imposing anti-siphoning
rules on pay-cable TV, however, the FCC found no evidence substantiating
charges of siphoning and concluded that no rules were needed.2 Nevertheless, eight months later, before any pay-cable operations had begun, the
Commission reversed itself, found that pay-cable presented a threat of
siphoning to broadcast TV similar to that posed by subscription television,
and extended program restraints governing STV to pay-cable TV. 2 The
rule imposed on pay-cable by the FCC protected conventional broadcasters by restricting cablecasts of feature films, sports events, and commercial
advertising by cable operators.Y
Glen 0. Robinson dissenting and concurring); Memorandum Opinion and Order 23 F.C.C.2d
825, 828 (1970); Berman, supra note 1, at 176.
2 See First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202 (1969). The most profitable programming available, and that which broadcasters feared was most subject to siphoning, includes
feature films, sports events, and series programs, such as soap operas. See Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 827-28 & n.6 (1970).
2' See First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).
2 Id. at 203.
25 The FCC first imposed anti-siphoning rules on cable television in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970) (presently codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1976), as
amended by Second Report and Order, 35 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 767 (1975)). See Hoffer, supra
note 11, at 480-81; Krasnow & Quale, Developing Legal Issues in Cable Communications, 24
CATH. L. REv. 677 (1975).
17The FCC limited cablecasting of feature films, sports events, and commercial advertising because such programming constitutes the bulk of broadcast fare and thus is most likely
to be siphoned. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 828 (1970). Under
the rules, only those feature films which have been in general release in theatres for less than
three years, for more than ten, or those to which a local broadcast station holds exhibition
rights are available for pay-cablecasting. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(a) (1976). Foreign films may be
shown without regard to release date, provided they are not "dubbed" in English. Id. at §
76.225(a)(iv).
The rules divide sports programming into specific events (i.e., the World Series) and nonspecific events (i.e., New York Yankees home games). A specific event which has appeared
on conventional television during any of the five seasons preceding the proposed cablecast
may not appear on pay-cable under the rules. Id. at § 76.255(b). If a regularly recurring event
takes place at intervals greater than one year (i.e., the Olympics),then cablecasters may not
exhibit the event unless conventional television has not shown the event for ten years. Id.
Cablecasters may not transmit current specific sports events for five years from their creation.
Thereafter, the general rule governing specific events applies. Id. The rules promulgate a
complicated formula severely restricting the number of non-specific events that may be
shown. See id. at §§ 76.225(b)(3)(i), (ii). For an analysis of this formula, see Brief for Respondent United States at 6-7, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In
addition, the combined pay-cablecast hours of film and sports material may not exceed
ninety percent of total pay-cable programming. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(c) (1976). Finally, the
rules prohibit cable operators from carrying commercial advertising on their pay channels.
Id. at § 76.225(d).
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Immediately after imposition of the rules on pay-cable TV, Home Box
Office, Inc. a national cable systems supplier, and several motion picture
corporations petitioned the FCC for reconsideration.2 Upon denial of the
petitions by the Commission, 2 the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit granted the parties a review of the rules." In Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC,3 these petitioners posed three issues: whether the
Commission had exceeded its authority in promulgating the antisiphoning rules; whether the rules violate petitioners' first amendment
rights; 2 and whether the rules are arbitrary and capricious.33 After finding
that the FCC had -not established regulatory jurisdiction over pay-cable
TV sufficient to support promulgation of the rules, the court vacated the
rules imposed on cable operations.34 Furthermore, the court found that the
rules unnecessarily limited petitioners' first amendment rights5 and constituted an arbitrary exercise of the Commission's power.36
In addressing the jurisdictional question, the Home Box Office court
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970).
29 See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 35

F.C.C.2d 893 (1972).
20 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The court consolidated
fifteen cases for purposes of argument and decision in Home Box Office.
Section 402 of the Communications Act authorizes appeal of the Commission's final antisiphoning orders. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970). Jurisdiction over the action is granted by 28
U.S.C. § 2342 (1970) which provides in part that "[t]he court of appeals has exclusive
jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity
of-(1) all final orders of the Federal Communications Commission made reviewable by
section 402(a) of Title 47. . . ." See also Memorandum Opinion and Order, 51 F.C.C.2d 317
(1975), holding that the anti-siphoning rules were final and binding and would not be waived.
21 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
" U.S. CONST. amend. I states in relevant part, "Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
3 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 18, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
1 Id. at 34. Similar anti-siphoning rules governing STV and challenged in Home Box
Office were left intact by the court. Id. at 59-60. See text accompanying notes 77-88 infra.
Subsequent to Home Box Office, the FCC vacated the anti-siphoning rules imposed on STV.
46 U.S.L.W. 2339 (FCC January 3, 1978).
20 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 50-51 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
3a Id. at 40.
37 Id. at 25-26. See text accompanying notes 3-13 supra.
20 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current version at 47
U.S.C. § 151 (1970)). The Supreme Court has stated that the basic goal of the first amendment, incorporated in the Communications Act, is to ensure "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources. . .essential to the welfare of the
public." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). Pursuant to this policy, the
FCC has regulated the communications industry to increase "the number of outlets for
community self-expression and [augment] the public's choice of programs and types of
services." First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202 (1969), rev'd sub nom. Midwest Video
Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated, 406 U.S. 649 (1972). These
policies of diversity and localism have become important subgoals in the FCC regulatory
plan. See note 43, infra.
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noted that the traditional basis for FCC regulatory authority is missing
because pay-cable TV makes no demands on scarce spectrum space.37 The
court, therefore, looked to the Communications Act and recent case law
to define FCC regulatory authority in the cable field. Although the Communications Act charged the Commission with the development and regulation of a national and world-wide communications service, 3 FCC regulatory jurisdiction encompassed only broadcasters and common carriers. 39 In
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co." and United States v. Midwest
Video Corp.,4' however, the Supreme Court reviewed FCC authority over
cable television and held in both cases that the FCC may exercise authority over cable operations but only to the extent that such regulation is
reasonably ancillary to the Commission's jurisdiction over the broadcast
television industry.42
In postulating the reasonably ancillary jurisdictional standard, the
Southwestern Cable Court upheld FCC authority to prohibit cable importation of distant television signals.43 Because cable television qualified as
an instrument of interstate and foreign communication by wire within the
3'See note 13 supra.
40 392 U.S. 157 (1968). In Southwestern Cable, the Court upheld FCC authority to prohibit the importation of "distant signals" into the San Diego television market by cable
system operators to promote localism in broadcasting. Id. at 159-60; see note 43 infra. Distant
signals are television signals beyond a viewer's normal reception range that may be received
with the assistance of a cable television system. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.61, 76.63 (1976).
" 406 U.S. 649 (1972). The Court in Midwest Video affirmed FCC authority to require
cable operators to cablecast on certain channels programming produced exclusively for the
cable system. Id. at 662-63. In upholding the regulatory action, the Court noted that the
cablecasting requirement furthered Commission policies of program diversification and enhancement of local television service. Id. at 667-70.
42Id. at 670; 392 U.S. at 178.
13 The importation of distant television signals frustrated a long-held and congressionally
approved objective of fostering the development of locally controlled broadcast television. See
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 174-75 (1968); Walsh, CATV: Let
the Cables Grow, 55 MARQ. L. Rxv. 205, 214, 227 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Walsh]. For a
criticism of the localism policy, see Hagelin, supra note 6, at 476, 503; Walsh, supra, at 22931. The distant signals divided audiences and revenues in the local television market between
the cable system and struggling UHF and educational stations. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173-76 (1968). Reduced audiences meant reduced revenues for
community broadcast stations. See Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 413-25 (1959), modified,
Carter Mountain Transm'n Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459, 465 (1962). The competitive effect of distant
signals thus threatened the survival of local stations and warranted protective measures. See
Comment, Federal and State Regulation of Cable Television: An Analysis of the New FCC
Rules, 1971 DUKE L.J. 1151, 1156. The Commission, therefore, held that cable operators would
not be allowed to extend broadcast signals beyond authorized areas at the expense of important regulatory policies. See Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 478, 505 (1968).
In upholding FCC authority to regulate the importation of such signals, the
Southwestern Cable Court noted that the Commission "has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting." 392 U.S. at 177. Since FCC authority over use of broadcast signals was also firmly
established, the regulations in Southwestern Cable were a proper exercise of FCC jurisdiction.
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meaning of section 152(a) of the Communications Act,4" the Court held
that the Commission could restrict cable use of broadcast signals., Since
the distant signal rules merely regulated use of television broadcast signals, the Court reasoned that this exercise of FCC authority was reasonably ancillary to the performance of the Commission's regulatory responsibilities over television broadcasting." In executing those duties, the Commission could, therefore, issue necessary rules and regulations."
In United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,"5 the Supreme Court reconsidered and narrowly affirmed the Southwestern Cable construction of FCC
authority over cable television. A four judge plurality adopted
Southwestern Cable's "reasonably ancillary" standard as defining the
limit of Commission jurisdiction over cable television49 and affirmed FCC
rules requiring cable operators to cablecast original programming on certain cable channels. 0 The plurality posited FCC jurisdiction on section
152(a) of the Communications Act' but noted that the section establishes
no proper regulatory objectives to support Commission jurisdiction over
cable TV.5 2 The Court held that FCC jurisdiction over cable is reasonably
ancillary to the regulation of broadcasting only if the regulatory action
1, See note 4 supra. The programming received and distributed by cable systems is
produced principally for and distributed to national television networks for eventual dissemination throughout the country. The Southwestern Cable Court thus found cable systems,
insofar as they use broadcast signals, to be in the stream of interstate communication and
thereby within the regulatory jurisdiction of the FCC. 392 U.S. at 168-69.
392 U.S. at 168-69.
" See id. at 175-78.
'T Id. at 178. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970) (granting the Commission general rulemaking
authority). The Court, however, limited its holding to the specific facts and refused to define
the limits of the Commission's authority to regulate cable television under § 152(a) because
of the narrow jurisdictional question presented. 392 U.S. at 178. The two functions ascribed
to cable television by the Southwestern Cable Court are facilitation of reception of local
broadcast stations in adjacent areas and transmission of distant broadcast signals beyond the
reception range of the community. Id. at 163. In carefully limiting the holding to the
"circumstances" of the case and the rules promulgated, the Court restricted confirmation of
FCC ancillary jurisdiction to the functions described above. See Buckeye Cablevision, Inc.
v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Berman, supra note 1, at 153-54.
" 406 U.S. 649 (1972).
"

Id. at 662-63.

The rules, affirmed by the Midwest Video plurality, required a cable television system
with 3500 or more subscribers to operate to a significant extent as a local TV outlet by
cablecasting original programming and to make available cable TV facilities for local production and presentation of programming. Id. at 653-54. The Rules, originally codified at 47
C.F.R. § 76.201 (1973), were later rescinded by the Commission in Report and Order, 49
F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974). Although cablecasting would compete with local broadcast stations for
audiences, the programming would also serve FCC regulatory goals of fostering the development of local television outlets and diversification of programming and types of services
offered to the public. See notes 38 & 43 supra. Since the programming did not involve
broadcast signals beyond an authorized range, the Commission held that the question of
unfair competition did not arise. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry,
15 F.C.C.2d 417, 421 (1968); Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 478, 506 (1968).
, 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970). See 406 U.S. at 660-61; note 44 supra.
52 406 U.S. at 661.
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pursues a proper objective of the Communications Act." The Commission
can demonstrate that such an objective underlies a chosen regulatory action if that action will "further the achievement of long-established regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting."54 Because the rules challenged in Midwest Video required program origination by cable operators,"
the plurality determined that the rules furthered FCC policies of program
diversification and enhancement of locally controlled television service."
As such, the cable regulations served proper objectives of FCC regulatory
57
authority and, therefore, came within the reasonably ancillary standard.
In Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video, the Supreme Court thus
recognized and affirmed an expansive jurisdiction for the FCC based on
section 152(a) of the Communications Act. Consistent with the spirit of the
Act,58 the Court accorded the FCC great flexibility and broad regulatory
authority to enable the Commission to respond more readily to the rapidly
changing technology of the communications industry.59 Nevertheless, the
Court circumscribed that discretion in both decisions by permitting the
FCC to regulate cable television only when such action satisfied the purposes justifying federal regulation of broadcast TV.60 Unless the Commission demonstrates that a regulation of cable television will further established goals in the field of television broadcasting, and, therefore, is reasonably ancillary to FCC authority over broadcasting, such regulation will
not withstand judicial review.
1 See id. at 667-70; text accompanying notes 3-6 supra.
1,406 U.S. at 667-68, quoting First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202 (1969). See
notes 38 & 43 supra.
See note 50 supra.
Fostering diversity and development of localism in television service, both established
FCC regulatory policies, underlie the Commission regulations in both Southwestern Cable
and Midwest Video. The cablecasting requirement in Midwest Video was upheld as furthering
Commission policies of fostering program diversity and developing local outlets for community expression. 406 U.S. at 667-70. See Brief for Petitioner Home Box Office, Inc. et al.
at 55-56, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See notes 40, 43 & 47
supra.
' See 406 U.S. at 667-70.
s'See text accompanying notes 5-6, 38, 43 supra.
' See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943); FCC
v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940) (each construing Communications
Act to allow FCC sufficient flexibility and authority to respond to rapidly changing communications technology).
11In neither Southwestern Cable nor Midwest Video did the Supreme Court authorize
sweeping FCC authority over cable television as a whole, but rather the Court required that
every assertion of jurisdiction over cable be justified independently as reasonably ancillary
to the Commission's authority over broadcasting. See United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649, 662-70 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178
(1968). See also National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs. v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 612-13
(D.C. Cir. 1976). The FCC admits that its authority does not extend to any and all enterprises
which may be connected with some aspect of communications. Regulatory authority over
operations related to broadcasting may be exercised by the Commission only if such an
exercise is ancillary to FCC authority over broadcasting. The Commission thus claims no
"plenary power" over cable television. See Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 429 (1959).
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The Home Box Office court applied the FCC jurisdictional standard
defined in Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video to the anti-siphoning
rules regulating pay-cablecast programming by inquiring whether the rules
furthered an established goal in the regulation of broadcasting."' The D.C.
Circuit noted that established Commission policy regarding regulation of
broadcast programming allows conventional TV broadcasters full discretion in selection of programming.2 Although the Commission must strike
a balance between maintaining a competitive broadcast system and placing restraints on broadcasters to serve the public interest,63 the FCC has
not attempted to control program content. 4 The Home Box Office court
observed that although the Commission argued that the first amendment
and the anti-censorship provisions of the Communications Act65 "strip it
of any authority to require or to prohibit [the] broadcast of any particular
material," 6 the FCC has not avoided entirely the question of program
content restraint. Under certain circumstances, the D.C. Circuit has required FCC regulation of programming. In Citizens Committee to Save
WEFM v. FCC,7 for example, that court held that the FCC must determine whether the assignment of radio license, resulting in the loss of an
entire program format, would serve the public interest. 6 Because such a
1,See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Home Box
Office court noted that the Southwestern Cable analysis of FCC regulation of competition
between cablecasters and broadcasters was not applicable to the Home Box Office facts
because the FCC did not allege that pay-cable operations would divide audiences and
revenues to such an extent as to threaten the existence of broadcast stations. Id. at 29; see
note 43 supra.
" Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 29-30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Commission
has stated that agency regulation of programming is unnecessary because public acceptance
and economic necessity alone will force broadcasters to meet a community's programming
needs. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 230 (1973), cited with approval in Notice of Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580, 580-81 (1976).
11See Network Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7293 (1960).
6 In restricting cable use of common carrier facilities prior to Home Box Office, the FCC
insisted that it was not "acting in any fashion which would constitute 'censorship."' Decision,
32 F.C.C. 459, 462 (1962).
95The Communications Act provides that the FCC has no power to censor radio communications and may in no way interfere with the right of free speech through such communications. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
so Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See In re Request by
Hon. Ronald Reagan, 38 F.C.C.2d 378 (1972) (refusing to prohibit broadcast of national
elections projections). The Commission may regulate broadcasting in limited respects but
may not engage in censorship. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
396 (1969); FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940).
17506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
,8Id. In WEFM, the court reviewed FCC approval of a radio license assignment to a
purchaser. Id. at 249. Upon Commission approval of the assignment, the purchaser intended
to change the radio station's program format from classical to rock music. Id. at 249. Because
such a change would result in the loss of a type of programming, the WEFM court held that
the FCC had the authority and duty to determine whether such an assignment would serve
the public interest. Id. at 262. The WEFM court noted, however, that the loss of specific
programs through competition should not be considered in establishing regulatory policy. The
court therefore held that the only valid policy consideration to regulation of programming is
the loss of entire program formats due to a licensing assignment. See id. at 250.
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finding became prerequisite to approval of the license assignment, 9 the
FCC was forced to regulate programming, at least to a limited extent, in
contravention of its established policy.
Although since WEFM, the FCC has made public interest findings
concerning assignments of radio licenses, which involved the FCC in the
regulation of programming to a limited degree, the Commission insists that
it has no statutory authority to regulate program formats.70 The Commission, therefore, continues to allow conventional broadcasters complete
freedom in program selection. 7 Since the anti-siphoning rules imposed on
pay-cable TV regulate program content contrary to the Commission's own
established broadcasting regulatory policy,72 the Home Box Office court
held that the rules serve no proper objective of the Communications Act
and thus are beyond the FCC's reasonably ancillary jurisdiction over
cable. 73 Although holding that the FCC had not sufficiently established
jurisdiction over pay-cable to justify promulgation of the anti-siphoning
rules, the Home Box Office court did not require the Commission to support FCC rulemaking with specific statutory authority.74 The court's decision effectively will require the Commission to demonstrate that any regulation of cable television serves a purpose for which the FCC legitimately
can regulate conventional broadcasting operations.7 By showing that a
Id. at 262.
See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858, 859-61, 865-66 (1976). The
Commission argued thatregulation of broadcast programming is analogous to imposing common carrier responsibilities on broadcasters. Id. at 860. The Communications Act requires
common carriers to obtain FCC approval to commence or discontinue communications services. See 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1970 & Supp. 1975). The Act specifically excludes broadcasters
from common carrier status, id. at § 153(h), and does not require them to obtain FCC
permission to commence or discontinue programming. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60
F.C.C.2d 858, 859 (1976). The Commission argues that by directing the FCC to regulate
broadcast programming, the court imposed common carrier obligations on broadcasters while
the Communications Act had specifically excluded them from such obligations. Id.
7, See Notice of Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580, 580-81 (1976). By allowing broadcasters freedom in programming selection, the Commission does not violate the directive of WEFM.
WEFM only requires the FCC to determine whether a license assignment, resulting in the
loss of an entire program format, would serve the public interest. See note 68 supra.
72 The Commission has stated that the anti-siphoning rules seek to ensure that films
shown on pay-cable are so recent that they will not appear on broadcast television. The rules
also eliminate competition between cablecasters and broadcasters for the same programming
by limiting the programming available to pay-cable. See Memorandum Opinion and Order,
51 F.C.C.2d 317, 322 (1975). See also First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 55 (1975).
7 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
' Id. at 34. The court in Home Box Office held that to construe the Communications
Act to require specific statutory support for FCC regulatory action would defeat the congressional purpose of according the Commission sufficient flexibility to enable the agency to
respond readily to the rapidly changing communications industry. Id. at 34. See United
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172-73 (1968); FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940).
" Although the Home Box Office court recognized that the FCC's authority over communications is broad and flexible, the court held that the Commission may regulate pay-cable
"

'
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cable regulation furthers an established goal for which the Commission can
regulate broadcasting, the FCC will establish that the regulation serves a
proper objective of the Communications Act 7 6 and thus is within the reasonably ancillary standard adopted in Southwestern Cable and Midwest
Video."
After vacating the anti-siphoning rules because the Commission failed
to establish jurisdiction, the Home Box Office court, to avoid multiple
remands, chose to address petitioners' charges that the rules violate the
first amendment and are arbitrary and capricious."8 Petitioners alleged
that the FCC had impaired cablecasters' first amendment rights by restricting without justifiable cause the programming available to pay-cable
systems."6 The FCC responded that NationalAssociation of Theatre Owners v. FCC,8" which upheld similar but more stringent subscription television rules" in the face of a first amendment attack, likewise supported the
constitutionality of the cable rules.12 The Home Box Office court held,
however, that the NATO decision does not support limitations on first
amendment rights of cablecasters 3 The court reasoned that because the
regulatory problems created by scarce spectrum space, central to the analysis in NATO, are missing in the pay-cable context, the restrictions-on first
amendment rights approved in NATO may not be extended to pay-cable
operators.8
The question addressed in NATO was whether first amendment prohibitions of limitations on freedom of speech are violated by conditioning the
grant of a television broadcast license on the type of programming to be
offered to the public." The grant of a broadcast license necessitates allocaTV only after establishing that such an exercise of regulatory power falls within the reasonably ancillary standard. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
accord, United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 667-68 (1972). See also text
accompanying notes 50, 55 & 60 supra.
7, See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"Id.
7' Id.

See Brief for Petitioners Home Box Office, Inc., et al. at 30-33.
$0420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). Theatre owners in
"

NATO sought to block Commission authorization of subscription television operations by
arguing that § 151 of the Communications Act, see text accompanying note 16 supra, prohibits the Commission from withdrawing any of the limited channels of the broadcast spectrum
for use only by those willing to pay to receive programming: 420 F.2d at 198, 200. The D.C.
Circuit, however, affirmed FCC authorization of STV operations. Id. at 208; see note 34 supra.
"' In NATO, the D.C. Circuit affirmed substantially the same anti-siphoning rules at
issue in Home Box Office against challenges by STV operators. 420 F.2d at 207-08. The FCC
argued that the first amendment analysis governing the NATO court's decision, see text
accompanying notes 85-93 infra, should apply with equal force in the cable context. Brief for
Respondent FCC at 32-33, 40-41, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

a2Brief for Respondent FCC at 32-35, 37-38, 40-41.
" Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 43-44 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"

Id. at 44-45.

National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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tion of spectrum space to one of the many persons seeking access to that
limited resource.86 In making such a grant, the FCC seeks to develop a
diverse and uninhibited broadcast service.87 In the regulatory action which
gave rise to NATO, the FCC had determined that the allocation of one of
the few broadcast channels to a private subscription service would be
justified only if the service's programming would be distinct from that
already available on conventional television." Thus, the FCC had imposed
anti-siphoning rules on subscription television to ensure that subscription
programming would better serve the community by offering diverse programming and not merely duplicate "free" or conventional TV.89 Because
of the necessity of allocating limited spectrum space, ° the NATO court
affirmed the conditioned licensing and the STV anti-siphoning rules.9' By
approving a licensing process that includes comparative considerations as
the type of programming to be offered by the proposed broadcaster,12 the
NATO court thus enabled the FCC to grant licenses to persons who will
provide diverse programming and alternative services to the public,
thereby improving the overall communications service."
Programming considerations governing allocation of scarce spectrum
space and television licenses, the basis of FCC regulation of broadcast
television, are not applicable to the cable industry. As the Home Box
Office court recognized, problems requiring government allocation, such as
electrical interference among stations and scarce spectrum space, are absent. 4 The ability of cable to be subdivided into channels eliminates any
possible interference between stations or programs in a cable system.
See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
See National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
88See Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466, 484 (1968).
81Id; see National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
U

'7

,0See text accompanying notes 1-6 supra.

See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
The NATO court relied on National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943), in which the Supreme Court held that the scarcity of broadcast channels allows
restrictions on first amendment rights of broadcasters and an allocation plan designed to
provide the best possible communications service, see id. at 216; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio
Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 190,
207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In National Broadcasting Co., the Supreme Court affirmed chain
broadcasting regulations promulgated by the FCC. The regulations attacked allegedly anticompetitive practices by network broadcasters which restricted the control local affiliates
exercised over programming. 319 U.S. 190, 197-209 (1943). By denying broadcast licenses to
radio stations engaging in such practices, the regulations practically countered their effect.
In dismissing network claims that the regulations abridged free speech, the Court recognized
that the FCC has a duty under the Communications Act to allocate scarce spectrum space
to ensure the best practicable communications service for each community. Id. at 216-17.
Because broadcasters seek access to this limited resource at the expense of others, the Court
held that the Constitution permits a requirement that broadcasters using the airwaves serve
the public interest as defined by the FCC. Id. at 216-17, 226-27.
,3See National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
" Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-45 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Hoffer, supra
note 11, at 492; Note, Cable Television and the FirstAmendment, 71 CoLum. L. REV. 1008,
1018 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cable TV and the FirstAmendment].
"

92
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Cable operators control channel access and programming. Furthermore,
cable technology eliminates the problem of limited channel capacity.
While cable systems presently are required to have a capacity of at least
twenty channels,95 available technology can expand capacity to eighty
channels, and future channel capacity may be unlimited." Thus, the scarcity rationale justifying governmental licensing control breaks down in the
cable field. Because pay-cable makes no use of scarce spectrum space, no
underlying support exists that justifies FCC programming restrictions similar to those limiting the first amendment rights of STV operators. Cable's
multiplicity of channels obviates any need for government allocation of a
limited communications resource. Absent a substantial governmental interest, 8 therefore, restrictions on the first amendment rights of pay-cable
47 C.F.R. § 76.252(a)(1) (1976).
See Note, The Limits of Broadcast Self-Regulation Under the First Amendment, 27
STANFORD L. REv. 1527, 1542 n.67 (1975).
11See Cable TV and the First Amendment, supra note 94, at 1020. The NATO court
permitted the FCC to restrict STV programming to ensure that subscription service would
provide a beneficial supplement to conventional television. See text accompanying notes 8893 supra. With the anti-siphoning rules challenged in Homne Boi Office, the Commission
attempted to relegate pay-cablecasting to a similar role. See First Report and Order, 52
F.C.C.2d 1, 5 (1975); Memorandum Opinion and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 891, 898 (1972). The
Commission, however, never explained why pay-cable should serve merely as a supplement
to broadcast television, and no reason is readily apparent. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
In Home Box Office, the FCC admitted that pay-cable makes no use of the broadcast
spectrum but insisted that such use is not central to the validity of pay-cable regulations.
See Brief for Respondent FCC at 35. The Commission argued that the anti-siphoning rules
serve a broadcast purpose and promote the public interest, relying on United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) and ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1975)
for support. Brief for Respondent FCC at 35 & n.37. The Commission's reliance on these
cases, however, was misplaced. Both cases concerned FCC rules designed to promote diversity
and increase the quantity of programming available to a community. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 654-55 (1972); ACLU v. FCC, 523 F.2d 1344, 1348-49 (9th
Cir. 1975). Neither decision contemplated restrictions on pay-cable programming, the essence
of the rules challenged in Home Box Office. See Comment, Regulation of Pay Cable and
Closed Circuit Movies: No Room in the Wasteland, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 600, 616 (1973). The
court in Home Box Office thus held that absent a need for restrictions on first amendment
rights, such as public access to a limited communications resource, the scarcity theory espoused in National BroadcastingCo. will not support FCC regulatory action over pay-cable.
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 44-46 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
11A regulation may be justified if the regulation serves an important and substantial
governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression and if the restrictions are no greater than necessary to serve that interest. Unitdd States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968). The defendant in O'Brien was convicted of burning his selective service
registration certificate in violation of federal law. Id. at 369. The defendant argued that
burning the certificate was "symbolic speech" communicating his protest of the war in Vietnam, and thus protected by the first amendment. Id. at 376. The Court affirmed defendant's
conviction and held that the challenged law facilitated operation of the selective service
system. Id. at 382, 386: Since the law furthered the substantial governmental interest of
ensuring the availability of registration certificates for use by the selective service system,
and since the ihfringement on defendant's first amendment rights was no greater than essential to further that interest, the Court found the law consistent with the first amendment.
"
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operators cannot stand.9
In addition to the first amendment challenge, the petitioners in Home
Box Office attacked the anti-siphoning rules by arguing that promulgation
of the rules constituted arbitrary and capricious action by the FCC."'0 As
a product of informal rulemaking under section 303 of the Communications
Act,' 0' the anti-siphoning rules are subject to reversal by a reviewing court
only if found to be arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.' To satisfy this measure, however, the Commission must prove
Id. at 377-78; 381-82. See generally Alfange, Free Speech And Symbolic Conduct: The Draft
Card Burning Case, 1968 Sue. CT. REV. 1; Velvel, Freedom of Speech And The Draft Card
Burning Cases, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 149 (1968).
" The NATO court affirmed program restraints imposed on STV by which the FCC
sought to allocate the limited broadcast spectrum to promote diversity and ensure that
subscription television did not merely duplicate conventional TV. National Ass'n of Theatre
Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194, 207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Because the restraints served the
substantial governmental interest of fostering a diverse communications system while efficiently allocating the scarce broadcast spectrum, the rules were affirmed. See id. This interest
is missing in the cable context.
I Brief for Petitioner's Home Box Office, Inc. et al. at 58, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
I01See 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970). All federal rulemaking is subject to the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1970 & Supp. 1975). Four types of agency regulation are
created by the Act; in descending order of procedural formality, they are: (1) adjudication,
id. at § 554, (4) formal rulemaking, id. at §§ 556-57, (3) informal rulemaking, id. at § 553(c),
(4) non-formalized decisionmaking, id. at §§ 553(a)(b). See Note, Judicial Review of the
Facts in Informal Rulemaking: A Proposed Standard, 84 YALE L.J. 1750, 1751 n.5 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Judicial Review of the Facts].
Formal adjudication and informal rulemaking are the two most common types of agency
action. Formal adjudication requires a quasi-judicial hearing before an administrative law
judge. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). By contrast, informal rulemaking simply requires notice of a
hearing, an opportunity for interested persons to comment, and a concise statement from the
agency of the basis and purpose of the rules adopted. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. 1975). See
Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L,J. 38, 40 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Pedersen]. Section 553(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that when
rules are required by statute to be "made on the record," formal rulemaking procedures must
be observed. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (Supp. 1975). Nevertheless, section 303(a) of the Communications Act, which authorizes FCC rulemaking, does not require that the rules of that agency
be made on the record. Thus, Commission rules constitute informal rulemaking and are
subject to review. See note 102 infra. See generally Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking
Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 375 (1974); Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. Rxv. 185 (1974).
102The appropriate standard of review of informal rulemaking is a confused area of
administrative law and in reality may be a question of form over substance. One question
raised on review of the anti-siphoning rules in Home Box Office was whether informal rulemaking is subject to review under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard or under the
"substantial evidence" standard. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 34-35
(D.C. Cir. 1977). The simple response is that the substantial evidence standard of review
governs only rulemaking meeting the formal procedural requirements of §§ 556-557 of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The arbitrary or capricious standard, on the other hand,
controls review of informal rulemaking. Because FCC informal rulemaking need not meet the
procedural requirements of formal rulemaking, informal Commission action should be reviewed under the "arbitrary or capricious" standard. See id. at §§ 553, 706(A), (E); see, e.g.,
Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 141 (1973); National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512
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that the regulation is necessary, because a regulation, although reasonable
when considered alone, is capricious if the problem to be remedied does
not exist.' °3 Relying on this standard, the Home Box Office court examined
the need for regulations'' by questioning whether the record showed that
siphoning would occur in the absence of any regulation. 5
Although judicial review of the Commission's rulemaking required a
showing of necessity, the court found that the FCC supported the charge
of siphoning with "scanty" evidence.'0 ' After previously dismissing broadF.2d 688, 700 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827 (1975). See also Pedersen, supra note 101,
at 48 n.48 and cases cited therein.
Although the substantial evidence standard governs judicial review of formal rulemaking
under § 706(E), that standard also applies under the language of the statute to agency action
"otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." 5 U.S.C. §
706(E) (1970). Because informal rulemaking produces a record, the cited language arguably
refers to informal rulemaking. See JudicialReview of the Facts, supra note 101, at 1752. The
Supreme Court has not ruled directly on thpReviewing courts, including the Supreme Court,
however, repeatedly have applied the substantial evidence rule to informal agency rulemaking. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742,746 & 753 (1972);
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 761, 763 (1972); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971); Chrysler Corp. v. Department of
Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 667-68 (6th Cir. 1972). See also JudicialReview of the Facts,supra
note 101, at 1753 & n.19. This apparent confusion among the courts raises the question
whether the standard chosen and applied has any effect on the outcome of an appeal. Several
courts have noted that as the scrutiny of agency action intensifies, the standards'applied on
review seem to merge. See National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 705
(2d Cir. 1975) (Lumbard, J., concurring); Bunny Bear, Inc. v. Peterson, 473 F.2d 1002, 1006
(1st Cir. 1973). See also Pederson, supra note 101, at 1758 n.42.
The FCC action in Home Box Office was subjected to a standard of review more deferential to Commission discretion than such an action would have received under the substantial
evidence test because the arbitrary or capricious standard involves a less rigorous scrutiny of
agency action. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 n.79 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
941 (1976). Since the agency action was vacated, choice of standard apparently had no effect
on the outcome of the case.
"1 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977), quoting City of Chicago
v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See Brief for Petitioner Home Box Office, Inc. et
al. at 60.
I" Although a court may not substitute its judgment for that of an agency, it must
conduct a searching and careful review. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 415-16 (1971). A court reviewing an agency action must enforce all pertinent procedural
requirements. Id. at 417; Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The court also must examine the evidence supporting the action and determine whether it
adequately justifies the agency's decision. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d
841, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1970); cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541
F.2d 1, 34-36 (D.C. Cir. 1976); National Ass'n of Food Chains, Inc. v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308,
1314-15 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Furthermore, the court must ensure that the agency adequately
has considered all relevant factors and has demonstrated a "rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made." Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.
1977), quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc..v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); see
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
,05Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
'o,

Id. at 37.
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casters' claims of potential siphoning by pay-cable,' the FCC later imposed anti-siphoning rules on cable television' 8 without presenting evidence warranting this sudden and radical change of policy.' 8 To explain
the change and substantiate the charge of siphoning, the Commission
introduced evidence in Home Box Office that championship boxing
matches and a motorcycle stunt had appeared exclusively on pay-cable.,"
Arguably, such instances of siphoning do support the FCC's contention
that specific sports events may be bidded away from conventional television."' The court properly recognized however, that this evidence does not
address the issue of pay-cable's impact on the distribution market of feature films and non-specific sports events. '1 2 Moreover, reliance on these
instances to maintain a charge of future widespread siphoning by unregulated pay-cable ignores the likelihood of increased supply of original programming from production studios in response to growing market demands.'
The Commission also pointed to mathematical models prepared by
broadcasters to demonstrate the potential siphoning ability of pay-cable. 4
"I The Commission held that broadcasters and cable originators stand on the same
footing in acquiring programming. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 203 (1969). See
text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
' The Commission simply stated that "[riemedial action in this action should not wait
upon the threat becoming an actuality." Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825,
828 (1970). Agency action based on the risk of harm, rather than on factual proof of the harm,
has been sustained in certain situations. See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492,
507 (8th Cir. 1975) (approving agency action regulating air and water pollution); Industrial
Union Dept. v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (approving agency rule setting
safety level for concentrations of asbestos particles). Such cases, however, deal with rulemaking based on information at the fringe of scientific knowledge, where the consequences of
actions affecting the health of the public and the environment are difficult to predict or
reverse. Thus, more deference should be paid to the judgment of an agency in those areas.
The consequences of actions affecting the marketplace are more easily measured, more predictable, and may be stopped or reversed more readily. In such circumstances more concrete
evidence substantiating any rulemaking should be required. See Pederson, supra note 101,
at 49-50.
"IoSee Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1977); First Report and
Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 9 (1975).
"I Because pay-cable systems have secured, in the past, exclusive exhibition rights to
specific sports events, such as championship boxing matches, the systems have demonstrated
sufficient purchasing power to siphon at least some programming from conventional television. See Brief for Respondent FCC at 55.
"I Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The evidence of
siphoning presented by the FCC in Home Box Office concerned specific sports events only.
Because the evidence is so limited, no general conclusions can be drawn as to the likelihood
of siphoning of feature films and non-specific sports events by pay-cable TV. Id.
"I When the rule banning series programs from pay-cable was deleted, the Commission
acknowledged that increased demand for programming arising from competition by pay-cable
would result in increased supply from production studios. See Second Report and Order, 35
RAD. REG. 2d (P&F)767, 771-72 (1975). In spite of such a finding, the Commission has not
applied the same logic to programming restricted by present anti-siphoning rules. See First
Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 17 (1975).
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The models projected the growth of pay-cable services and revenues and
revealed that projected revenues would enable pay-cablecasting regularly
to outbid broadcast networks for the most profitable programming."' Because the figures used by those models are incommensurate, however,
these conclusions are distorted."' The conventional broadcasters who developed the models computed total cable revenues for 1980 based on
projections of the rate of pay-cable growth throughout the country and
then compared that figure with network expenditures in 1972."1 As the
court noted, such use of figures not only improperly sets speculated future
income against past expenses, but also ignores the question of whether
broadcast television will be able to increase spending for feature films and
sports programming without reducing profits below a competitive return."'
" Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1977), quoting First Report
and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 9-10 (1975).
II Id.
'I' Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
117Id.
"I The networks' mathematical models predicted fantastic growth for pay-cable and
revealed that by 1980 pay-cablecasters will be able systematically to outbid conventional
television for the best TV programming. Brief for Respondent FCC at 12 n.14, Home Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Commission accepted those predictions
without questioning whether such growth in pay-cablecasting actually will occur, and, if so,
whether broadcasters will be able to compete for programming. Home Box Office, Inc.
alleged that conventional television currently reaches 70,000,000 homes and has present
annual revenues of $4.5 billion and projected annual revenues of $7 billion by 1980. Brief for
Petitioners Home Box Office, Inc., et al. at 60. Pay-cable, on the other hand, claims only
400,000 subscribers, approximately V2 of 1 percent of commercial television. Id. Even with
one million subscribers, pay-cable operators would have a maximum of $2,400,000 monthly
for the purchase of 8 feature films to be shown nationwide, an average of $300,000 per film.
See First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 16 (1975). The average film purchased by networks
in 1973, by contrast, cost $750,000 and an additional $250,000 to independent stations in
syndication rights. Id. Given the disparity between prices paid by conventional television and
the economic resources of pay-cable, siphoning is pure fiction. Id. Predictions of great economic power of pay-cable ignore "the high capital and labor costs to the cable industry; the
division of revenues among program suppliers, channel lessee, and system operator; the
multiplicity of operators purchasing different programs; and the impossibility that all subscribers would want to watch the same programs." Id. Each factor will work to divide whatever economic power pay-cable might accumulate, thus rendering competition by pay-cable
still less a threat to broadcast television.
Even if pay-cable acquires significant economic power, conventional television may still
be able to compete effectively in the program distribution market. As the Home Box Office
court noted, this question was not even considered by the Commission before promulgating
the anti-siphoning rules. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In
1969, broadcast television enjoyed a 20 percent return on sales, well above the average 8 percent enjoyed by other industry. See R. NOLL, M. PECK, J. McGowA, ECONoMIc ASPECTS OF
TELEVISION REGULATION, 16 (1973); Hagelin, supra note 6, at 477. Broadcasters can arguably

use a portion of such apparently monopolistic profits to meet the competitive challenge for
programming raised by pay-cable. Because the Commission imposed the anti-siphoning
rules without considering the ability of broadcasters to compete with cable, the court
properly held that any conclusion the FCC might draw from the evidence before it would be
arbitrary. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 38-39 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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Because these defective models were at the heart of the Commission's
contention that siphoning would occur,"1 9 the court held that any regulatory action taken in reliance on such models would be arbitrary.'2 The
imposed on
Home Box Office court thus found the anti-siphoning rules
2
pay-cable to be an arbitrary exercise of agency authority.'1
In holding that the anti-siphoning rules were an arbitrary exercise of
Commission authority and violative of the first amendment rights of cable
operators and vacating those rules as beyond FCC jurisdiction, the court
in Home Box Office checked the Commission's growing jurisdiction over
cable television. By requiring the Commission to demonstrate clear support for regulatory actions, either in specific statutory language or in consistently held regulatory policies in the broadcasting field, 22 the court gave
meaning to the reasonably ancillary jurisdictional standard established by
the Supreme Court in Southwestern Cable and Midwest Video. This definition of FCC authority forces the Commission back to its original purpose,
regulation of a scarce resource to develop the best possible communications
system. Moreover, this limitation of FCC jurisdiction does no violence to
the spirit of the Communications Act. Because the holding prohibits the
Commission from regulating cable television absent the necessary jurisdictional showing, the court has directed the FCC to foster the development
of new media in accordance with the express policies set out in the Communications Act. Such an approach to the regulation of the developing
communications industry is essential if cable television and other media
services are to be viable alternatives in the communications network.
RICHARD

P.

GODDARD

,, See Brief for Respondent FCC at 12.
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Brief for Respondent United States at 32, 38; First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 75 (1975) (Statement of
Comm'r Glen 0. Robinson dissenting and concurring); Pearson, Cable: The Thread by Which
''

Television Competition Hangs, 27 RuToras L. REv. 800, 822 (1974).
"I Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
112See text accompanying notes 58-60 supra.

